Ibn Kammuna

This study inquires into the problem of memory representations within
Avicenna’s, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s and Suhrawardī’s theories of
memory. It engages with the three philosophers’ accounts through the
question of how the mind can establish a relation with a past object during
recollection. I argue that Avicenna’s account provides a representationalist
answer and involves two distinct systems of recollection. One is the causal
account of sensory recollection and the other is the readiness account of
intellectual recollection. While his theory fails to explain cognition as a
unified phenomenon, it is highly systematic in accounting for the personal
versus impersonal aspects of memories, the individual variability of
personal memories and the fallibility in recollection. Abū al-Barakāt
challenges representationalism. He attempts to unify all modes of cognition
under a single direct realist account grounded in the soul’s attentional
directedness. His proposed awareness-based account of recollection
reformulates perception as attentional awareness, retention as unattended
awareness and recollection as awareness of awareness. However, his
account remains incomplete in addressing the co-temporality objection
(how a present cognitive act can reach a non-present object?), because he
reintroduces mental forms for recollection. Suhrawardī attempts to
overcome the inconsistencies in both his predecessors and offers a direct
realist theory that unites all modes of cognition under what he calls ishrāqī
ḥuḍūrī. This notion explains perception as a direct relation between a nonabsent
object and a perceiver who directs her attention to it. In this account,
which can be termed the readiness account of recollection, retention
becomes a readiness to re-establish this relation and recollection becomes
a kind of past-perception. His introduction of the world of memory –as an
unfailing presential divine knowledge– can be interpreted as a solution to
the co-temporality objection. However, his theory fails to explain individual
variability and memory errors.

Moral identity refers to those characteristics and attributes that play an important role in the formation of an individual's identity. Indeed, the role performed by moral attributes in the evolution of a person's identity is such that quite a few of today's scholars maintain the oneness of the "self/psyche" and "moral character". Adopting this approach, researchers have set out to produce a wide range of research works in the field of moral philosophy. The present study is an attempt to measure the effect of three components of 'exercise', 'nutrition', and 'sleep' on shaping moral character from Avicenna's viewpoint. The findings of the present research illuminate the fact that the latter three elements have a direct influence on an individual's temperament, whereby suitable grounds are created in which moral character develops. Avicenna holds that this statement may not challenge man's will and authority. The reason is that every individual-by identifying his own physical coordinates and applying the most apt instructions-can approximate his temperament to moderation. As a result, the necessary ground for developing the most desirable moral character is created.

Just as the work of Ibn Gabirol and Maimonides need little introduction, the corpus of Ibn Kammūna (c. 1215–1284), a Mizrahi Jewish philosopher and ophthalmologist born in Baghdad who wrote a compelling treatise about Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is virtually unknown. His philosophical approach to Islam almost cost him his life. In this paper, the second chapter (dedicated to Judaism) of Ibn Kammūna's Examination of the Three Faiths and his Treatise on the Differences between the Rabbanites and the Karaites are analyzed. Furthermore, I briefly describe the Jewish community in Babylonia and Iraq—discussing antisemitism then and now—and I outline the main reasons why Ibn Kammūna is almost unknown, asserting that a Jewish thinker of Ibn Kammūna's magnitude deserves a place in the historiography of Jewish thought.

Shiraz is an old city continuously inhabited since the time of the pre-Islamic Sasanians and the capital of the part of Iran known as Fars. It survived the Mongols largely unscathed as its rulers prudently submitted to Mongol rule rather than resist. In the fifteenth century, it was visited by a traveller from Venice who recorded that it was a prosperous place with 200,000 inhabitants. The city had a long-standing reputation for scholarly activity and piety. In keeping with this, Shiraz has produced outstanding philosophers along with the grapes for Shiraz wine.

The subject of this article is to examine and analyze the understanding of propositions held by Ibn Kammūna, who lived in the 13 th century, from the perspective of the discipline of logic. Ibn Kammūna is a profound thinker who left significant works in the fields of philosophy and logic by thoroughly examining the works of figures such as Ibn Maymūn, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and al-Suhrawardī. The primary aim of the article is to analyze in detail the manner in which Ibn Kammūna approaches propositions, drawing upon the works he authored on matters of logic. The scope of the article is confined to al-Jadīd fī'l-ḥikma, Sharḥ al-uṣūl wa'l-jumal, and Sharḥ at-talwīḥāt, which are among Ibn Kammūna's works containing data on the subject of propositions, and within the context of these works, the definition of the proposition, categorical propositions, conditional propositions, modal propositions, the contradiction and conversion of propositions are comprehensively addressed. The literature review conducted revealed that the philosopher has been examined to a considerably limited extent in our country from the standpoint of logic, and this study is considered to make a significant contribution to remedying the aforementioned deficiency. A qualitative research methodology was adopted in the article, and techniques of analysis and comparison were employed. It is known that Ibn Kammūna, unlike authors such as Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sīnā, did not compose an independent work on propositions. For this reason, approximately sixteen works that have survived to the present day were meticulously examined through an individual scanning method, passages related to the subject of propositions within the context of the three identified works were recorded, and the data obtained were systematically classified and analyzed. As a result, it has been demonstrated that Ibn Kammūna's treatment of propositions draws substantially from the Peripatetic tradition through Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Kammūna shares a common view with Ibn Sīnā on the matter of indefinite propositions and explicitly states that such propositions ought to be understood as particular. Furthermore, he addresses propositions holistically on the subject of modality without making a distinction between simple and composite; and emphasizes that there is no limitation with respect to the number of modal propositions and that modal propositions can theoretically be unlimited.

Later authors in the Islamic world oversimplify when they speak of an Illuminationist school initiated by Suhrawardī. We can certainly point to several philosophers who were inspired by Suhrawardī in the generations after his death, and who wrote favourable commentaries on his works.

In this paper we will consider three of them, Ibn Kamūnah, al-Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn, but they are not direct successors or students of Suhrawardī, nor do they agree with him about everything. They actually draw on a wide range of sources, sometimes showing more sympathy to Avicenna than Suhrawardī had.

Thought experiments are crucial in scientific reasoning, helping to explore profound philosophical implications. Philosophers focus less on the current form or conclusions of scientific theories and more on the underlying thought processes driving them. This perspective is emphasised by Sir Arthur Eddington in his 1932 work, The Nature of the Physical World. The text also references famous thought experiments such as Laplace's Demon 1 and Maxwell's Demon 2, which illustrate key concepts in physics and philosophy. These examples highlight how thought experiments challenge and deepen our understanding of scientific principles beyond empirical data. Overall, the movement of thought in science is as significant as the theories themselves.

Mahiyet Ontolojisi: Felsefenin Temel Kavramları – I : Eserin tamamına erişmek için :
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Sürekli değişim hâlindeki görünenler dünyasının ardında yatan ve değişmez “öz” olan mahiyeti -bir şeyin varlığından ve zamansal koşullarından bağımsız saf “ne”liğini- İslam felsefesi geleneği üzerinden okumayı amaçlayan bu çalışma, İslam düşünürlerinin konuyla ilgili analizlerini bütüncül bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır. Eser, ele alınan tarihsel birikimin günümüz felsefesi için taşıdığı anlama da işaret ederek gelenek ile güncel tartışmalar arasında entelektüel bir köprü kurmayı hedeflemekte; mahiyeti sadece tarihsel bir kavram olarak değil, varlık, soyut nesneler ve Tanrı’nın doğası gibi tartışmaların merkezinde yer alan bir odak noktası olarak konumlandırmaktadır.

The quality of resurrection and the range of the afterlife have been among the thorny issues of post-Avicennan philosophy. Avicenna notoriously denied the corporeal resurrection and limited the individual afterlife to the rational part of human soul. By contrast, most theologians not only insisted on the truth of the corporeal resurrection but also endorsed an afterlife for non-rational animals on account of Quranic verses like (6:38), (16:68), (42:53), or (81:5). For the philosophers the afterlife was tied to the incorporeality and separateness of the soul; according to Fārābī (d. 950) and Avicenna (d. 1037), for instance, vegetative and animal souls were corporeal and thus deprived of postmortem existence. As Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1210) and Saʿd al-Dīn Taftāzānī (d. 1390) recount, while the majority of theologians held the belief that only God is incorporeal, and that incorporeality has no connection to resurrection, another group adopted the philosophers' reasoning. They also posited the human rational soul to be incorporeal and endeavored to interpret away Quranic verses that envisage resurrection for animals. A third and smaller group tried to safeguard a literal reading of the Quranic verses by arguing for incorporeal animal souls. The philosophers were not, however, as flexible as the theologians. Departing from an Avicennan theory of corporeal internal senses, they saw little space for the resurrection of animals. The Shīrāzī philosopher of the Iṣfahān school, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. ca. 1045/1635–6), known also as Mullā Ṣadrā, however, argues for the incorporeality of the imagination, which is one of the faculties of the animal soul, and on this basis, he argues in favor of a sort of afterlife for non-rational animals. Yet he is not clear as to whether the animal afterlife and resurrection is on an individual or species level. In this paper, I shall show how Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī argues in favor of animal resurrection and how he conceptualizes an afterlife for animals. This illustrates the Iṣfahān School’s efforts to harmonize philosophy, religion, and theology.

Making sense of death and providing a postmortem narrative are two major functions of religious traditions across the world. Among the major theories dealing with the captivating questions of the afterlife, Dharmic religious traditions (particularly Hinduism and Buddhism) deem metempsychosis or reincarnation to be the crucial explanation. Variegated versions of the idea have been present at different levels in other religious traditions (Chinese, indigenous American, Australian, and African traditional religions). Furthermore, in Abrahamic reli￾gions as well as Zoroastrianism, reincarnation is commonly received as complementary and peripheral theory or a minority report on death and what is supposed to come afterwards. The adoption of metempsychosis often mirrors intellectual exchanges between religious traditions and philosophical schools, as in the case of the prominent School of Illuminationism, which exemplifies such philosophical interactions between Neoplatonist Muslims, Jews, and the practitioners of Indian religions. The present special issue deals with a pivotal question: How
has the idea of metempsychosis been received in various religious traditions? To answer this central question, we enjoyed the insights and expertise of a group of religious studies scholars with diverse expertise in a wide range of religions and philosophical schools.

The Baghdadi physician and philosopher, Sa'd ibn Mansur (Izz Aldawla) Ibn Kammuna (d. 1284), 1 modeled a form of inter-religious scriptural inquiry that may have been even more radical than scriptural reasoning. But, like only a few like-minded spirits in this era, he did so against the weight of both Muslim and Jewish classical teaching. After setting the context for ibn Kammuna's work in 12 th-to 14 th-century Muslim-Jewish diatribes, this essay introduces his efforts to transform diatribe into dialogue by illustrating and analyzing the central principles of his dialogic method.

This paper extends the case in 'Conscious Thought Under Sensory Deprivation'. It then presents an overlooked puzzle for scholars of Ibn Sina. It concludes by identifying other contexts in which Ibn Sina deploys the general method of the Flying Man — a method that, in his moral philosophy, resembles the Enlightenment social-contract tradition. Could modern liberalism have its roots in Islamic philosophy?

Bu makalede, İslam metafizik düşüncesinin önemli bir meselesi olan varlık mahiyet ilişkisi, Sühreverdî'nin (ö. 587/1191) Hikmetü'l-İşrâk adlı eseri ve onun üzerine Şehrezûrî (ö. 687/1288) ve Kutbüddîn eş-Şîrâzî (ö. 710/1311) tarafından yazılan şerhler çerçevesinde mukayeseli bir yöntemle tartışılacaktır. Sühreverdî'nin keşf ve sezgi yöntemini benimsediği hikmet öğretisi gerek onun eserlerine yazılan şerhler gerekse görüşlerine yapılan atıflarla süreklilik kazanmıştır. Filozof, eserlerinde hem Meşşâî felsefe geleneğini eleştirmiş hem de ondan istifade ederek kendi ontolojik ve epistemolojik sistemini kurmuştur. Sühreverdî, Hikmetü'l-İşrâk adlı eserinde ortaya koyduğu ontolojik sisteminde İbn Sînâ'nın "mevcûd" terimi yerine "nûr"u, "Vâcibü'l-Vücûd" yerine de "Nûru'l-Envâr"ı tercih etmiştir. Ancak Sühreverdî, İbn Sînâ felsefesinde geçen vücûd, mahiyet, şey, hakikat gibi kavramların aklî itibarlar olduğunu dile getirir. Hikmetü'l-İşrâk adlı eserin şârihleri Şehrezûrî ve Şîrâzî de her ne kadar İbn Sînâ terminolojisini kullansalar da varlık, mahiyet, hakikat gibi kavramların aklî itibarlar olduğunu söylerler. Benzer şekilde birlik (vahdet), imkân, zorunlu kavramları da aklî yüklemlerdir. Çünkü İşrâkî geleneğine mensup bu düşünürlere * Bu makale Sühreverdî'nin Hikmetü'l-İşrâk Eseri ve Şerhlerinde Varlık-Mahiyet Problemi" başlıklı kitap bölümünün (Şeyhü'l-İşrâk'ın İzinde, Ankara: 2015) gözden geçirilmiş ve genişletilmiş hâlidir. İntihal Taraması/Plagiarism Detection: Bu makale intihal taramasından geçirildi/This paper was checked for plagiarism. Etik Beyan/Ethical Statement: Bu çalışmanın hazırlanma sürecinde bilimsel ve etik ilkelere uyulduğu ve yararlanılan tüm çalışmaların kaynakçada belirtildiği beyan olunur/It is declared that scientific and ethical principles have been followed while carrying out and writing this study and that all the sources used have been properly cited (Hatice Toksöz). Geliş/

While the concepts of dhāt/self, shu'ūr/consciousness, and al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt/selfconsciousness have gained prominence in recent philosophical discourse on the mind, particularly in the light of developments in neurobiology and neurophysiology. However, these concepts have a long history of usage in both Islamic and Western thought, dating back to the earliest periods. In his thought experiment, the Flying Man theorem, Avicenna (c. 980-1037 CE), one of the most influential philosophers of Islamic thought, addressed several key issues pertaining to the relationship between the soul and the body, the essence of the soul, the question of whether the soul has a separate and independent existence from the body, and the nature of consciousness. In his theory, which he discusses with partial differences in different works, Avicenna, initially posited that the soul has a separate and distinct existence from the body and that the soul has an immaterial essence. In the second stage, offering an indirect explanation of the existence of a single essence, namely the dhāt which prioritizes the functions of the different faculties of the immaterial, separate, and distinct realities of the soul and uniting these functions with the consciousness of 'I'. Nevertheless, there have been numerous interpretations of the objective that Avicenna sought to establish with his theory. While some have argued that he dealt with the essence and existence of the soul in his theory, others have argued that he also grounded the selfconsciousness of the soul in addition to this This study will examine Avicenna's theory of the flying man, elucidating its principal objective through an analysis of the theory's explanatory framework. Subsequently, an explanation will be provided regarding the notion of the soul being in the consciousness of its own dhāt. This study will evaluate Avicenna's distinction between the consciousness of the self (al-shu'ūr bi-zāt) and the consciousness of consciousness (al-shu'ūr bi al-shu'ūr) will be evaluated. It demonstrates that although Avicenna's theorising primarily concerns the soul as having an immaterial essence, separate and distinct from the body, at a secondary level he also seeks to prove that the soul is conscious of its own essence.

Dârülmülk Konya", bu sayısında XIII-XV. yüzyıl Konya ilim havzasına yolculuk ediyor ve Konya Masası'nı yeniden kurmanın imkanını matematik, astronomi, fizik, optik, kimya, farmakoloji, tıp gibi bilim alanlarında temayüz etmiş ulemâya konuk olarak gündeme taşıyor. Dârülmülk'ün İslâm bilim ve felsefe tarihindeki konumuna genel hatlarıyla temas eden elinizdeki sayı, siz değerli okurlarımıza Konya medreseleri hakkında bilgi vermeyi, kimi zaman talebe, kimi zaman da hoca olarak söz konusu medreselerle irtibatı bulunan düşünürlerin bilim eserleriyle tanıştırmayı amaç edinmiştir. Bu minval üzere Sultan II. Kılıçarslan döneminin tıp, farmakoloji ve astronomi bilginlerinden Hubeyş Tiflîsî, Sultan Alâeddin Keykubad nezdinde büyük saygıya mazhar olan Bibi Müneccime, bilge vezirliğinin yanı sıra aynı zamanda tabip olan Necmeddin Nahcuvânî, Meraga ve çevresinde edindiği astronomi, matematik ve tıp birikimini Konya ve Sivas'a taşıyarak geliştiren Kutbuddin Şîrâzî, Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmî'nin doktoru Beyhekim, kimya bilgisinin yanı sıra Mevlânâ'nın türbesini yapacak kadar iyi bir mimar olan Bedreddin Tebrîzî, Anadolu'nun İbn Sînâ'sı lakabıyla ün salan Hacı Paşa Konevî ve benzeri âlimlerin farklı disiplinlerdeki çalışmaları tanıtılmakta, Anadolu Selçuklular'dan Osmanlı'ya uzanan fikri sürekliliğin izlerinin Dârülmülk'ün bilim çehresi üzerinden gösterilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda büyük bir emek mahsulü olarak vücuda gelen özel sayımız on altı özgün makale ve röportajdan oluşmaktadır. Mevcut yazılar eser ve mekân görselleriyle desteklenmiş, Konya Dârülmülk KONYA BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ ADINA SAHİBİ

Ibn Sina (Avicenna) begins the Third Class of al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat on psychology with a direction: “Return to yourself and reflect”. In the few ensuing chapters, he accordingly gives certain admonitions with the intention of establishing and determining some general characteristics of human selfhood, or self-conscious subjectivity, as the most fundamental principle that a genuine philosophical anthropology must take as its point of departure. The opening direction thus seems to be highly consequential and determinative for any further methodic and thematic advances, providing the prospect of an entirely novel philosophical anthropology, a “metaphysics of human subjectivity”, that centers around the idea of a non-reflexive, self-conscious subjectivity. It goes without saying that such a philosophical anthropology is essentially different from the kind of Aristotelian psychology. Having proved that this self-conscious subjectivity is essentially identical to the soul—in its Aristotelian sense: Psūchê (ψυχή) as the first actuality of a naturally organized, or organic, body—however, he begins to shift the approach and regresses to the Aristotelian kind of philosophical psychology, as the prevailing and conventional way of doing anthropology in the medieval and pre-modern era. The rest of the Third Class is thus devoted entirely to reiterating traditional arguments for the existence of soul, explicating its ontological constitution, structure, and faculties together with a detailed account of their epistemological functions and operations. This radical shift in the anthropological approach raises a question about the status and function of the principle of human subjectivity in Ibn Sina’s philosophical anthropology as a whole.

This essay is the second assignment for the course in "The Self: East and West" of the "Philosophy and Religion" master programme at the University of Wales Trinity Saint David. In this assignment, the leading research question is: "Is the flying man threatened by the masked man? On ibn Sīnā’s argument and its (supposed) fallacy".

In honor of Professor Amitai’s retirement, this article offers some initial find-
ings concerning the triangular relationship between three Ilkhanid intellectu-
als: the convert and vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, the Muslim polymath al-Shīrāzī, and the Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūnah. By exploring these links, it also sheds light on one of the least studied aspects of Rashīd al-Dīn’s engagement with this Jewish heritage: his Muslim polemics against Judaism and the Jews. In this way, the article seeks to contribute to another topic Amitai has explored in his influential scholarship: the place of Jews and Judaism at the Ilkhanid court.

While the concepts of dhāt/self, shu’ūr/consciousness, and al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt/self-consciousness have gained prominence in recent philosophical discourse on the mind, particularly in the light of developments in neurobiology and neurophysiology. However, these concepts have a long history of usage in both Islamic and Western thought, dating back to the earliest periods. In his thought experiment, the Flying Man theorem, Avicenna (c. 980–1037 CE), one of the most influential philosophers of Islamic thought, addressed several key issues pertaining to the relationship between the soul and the body, the essence of the soul, the question of whether the soul has a separate and independent existence from the body, and the nature of consciousness. In his theory, which he discusses with partial differences in different works, Avicenna, initially posited that the soul has a separate and distinct existence from the body and that the soul has an immaterial essence. In the second stage, offering an indirect explanation of the existence of a single essence, namely the dhāt which prioritizes the functions of the different faculties of the immaterial, separate, and distinct realities of the soul and uniting these functions with the consciousness of ‘I’. Nevertheless, there have been numerous interpretations of the objective that Avicenna sought to establish with his theory. While some have argued that he dealt with the essence and existence of the soul in his theory, others have argued that he also grounded the self-consciousness of the soul in addition to this This study will examine Avicenna’s theory of the flying man, elucidating its principal objective through an analysis of the theory’s explanatory framework. Subsequently, an explanation will be provided regarding the notion of the soul being in the consciousness of its own dhāt. This study will evaluate Avicenna’s distinction between the consciousness of the self (al-shu’ūr bi-zāt) and the consciousness of consciousness (al-shu’ūr bi al-shu’ūr) will be evaluated. It demonstrates that although Avicenna’s theorising primarily concerns the soul as having an immaterial essence, separate and distinct from the body, at a secondary level he also seeks to prove that the soul is conscious of its own essence.

Öz: Bu çalışmanın amacı, Kutbuddin eş-Şirâzî'nin akılcı felsefeye ve Meşşâî tanım teorisine yönelik eleştirileri incelemektir. İşrâk felsefesi söz konusu olduğunda akla gelen ilk isimlerden biri Kutbuddin eş-Şirâzî'dir. Bu bağlamda 14. yüzyılda yaşamış olan Şirâzî, hem Sühreverdî'nin eserine şerh yazarak hem de müstakil eserler kaleme alarak İşrâkî tavrıyla dikkat çekmektedir. Bu anlamda İşrâkî tavırla ilgili en açık ifadeleri Hikmetü'l-işrâk'a yazdığı şerhte rastlamak mümkündür. Şirâzî, İbn Sînâ'nın tarif teorisine eleştiriler yönelterek tanımın; ortak kurucu unsurlardan yani cins ve ayırt edici kurucu unsurların toplamından meydana gelmesinin zor olduğunu belirtir. Biz bu çalışmada öncelikle Şirâzî'nin Hikmetü'l-işrâk'a yazdığı şerhinin "mukaddimesinde" yer alan İbn Sînâ'ya yönelik eleştirilerini, bahsî hikmete zarar verdikleri görüşünü ve İşrâk felsefesinin kaynaklarını ele almaya çalışacağız. Daha sonra Şirâzî'nin tarif konusunda İbn Sînâcı tarif teorisine yönelik eleştirilerin inceleyeceğiz. Elde ettiğimiz bilgilerden hareketle de, Şirâzî'nin İşrâkîlik tasavvurunu ortaya koymaya, tanım konusundaki eleştirilerinin kaynağını ve getirdiği çözüm önerileri ele alınacaktır.

Doğru düşünmenin kurallarını koyan mantık, tasavvur ve tasdik olarak iki kısma ayrılır. Tasavvur bölümünün amacı, tasavvurî bilinenlerden tasavvurî bilinmeyenlere ulaşmaktır. Dolayısıyla tasavvurî bilinmeyenlere ulaşmak için tariflere ihtiyaç duyarız. Bu makalede İşrâk felsefesinin önemli temsilcilerinden biri olan Şemsüddîn Şehrezȗrî'nin (öl. 687/1288'den sonra) tarif hakkındaki görüşleri, problemleri ele alış şekli ve bunlara verdiği cevaplar incelenmektedir. Şehrezûrî, müstakil felsefe ansiklopedisi olarak ifade edilebilecek olan Resâ'ilü'ş-Şecereti'l-ilâhiyye eserinin yanı sıra Sühreverdî'nin (öl. 587/1191) Hikmetü'l-işrâk ve et-Telvîhât eserlerine şerh yazmıştır. Şehrezûrî'nin tarif konusundaki görüşlerini Resâ'ilü'ş-Şecereti'l-ilâhiyye eseri başta olmak üzere Hikmetü'l-işrâk ve et-Telvîhât'a yazdığı şerhler esas alınarak incelenmiştir. Şehrezûrî, Resâ'ilü'ş-Şecereti'l-ilâhiyye ve et-Telvîhât şerhinde tarif konusunu Meşşâî tarzda ele alırken, Hikmetü'l-işrâk şerhinde ise Sühreverdî'yi takip ederek İbn Sînâcı tarif teorisine yönelik eleştirilerini incelemektedir. Şehrezûrî, Resâ'ilü'ş-Şecereti'l-ilâhiyye'de tarif konusunu tarif eden-tarif edilen ilişkisi bağlamında ele almaktadır. Tarifte meydana gelebilecek hataları ise Sühreverdî'nin et-Telvîhât'ını esas alarak ortaya koymaktadır. Hikmetü'l-işrâk şerhinde ise İbn Sînâ'nın (öl. 428/1037) el-İşârât'ta ortaya koyduğu tarif teorisini eleştirerek, tarifin zorluğuna dikkat çekmektedir. Özellikle tarifin cins ve ayrımdan meydana geldiği iddiası Şehrezûrî tarafından ciddi bir şekilde eleştiriye tabi tutulmuştur. Çalışmamızda ilk olarak tarifin, kendisinin hakikatinin belirlenmesi yani doğru bir şekilde nasıl tarif edileceği ele alınmakta ve Şehrezûrî'nin bu konu hakkındaki görüşleri incelenmektedir. Daha sonra beş tümele dayanarak ortaya çıkan tarif çeşitleri, misal ve kavram yoluyla tarif; tarifte dikkate alınması gereken şartlar Şehrezûrî'nin görüşleri çerçevesinden bakılarak ele alınmaktadır. Son olarak ise Şehrezûrî'nin, Fahreddin Râzî'nin (öl. 606/1210) ileri sürdüğü tarifin imkânına yönelik itirazlarını nasıl ele aldığı ve ne şekilde çözüm sunduğu incelenmektedir. Ayrıca onun İslâm mantık geleneğindeki yeri, önemi ve katkıları belirlenmeye çalışılacaktır.

Şihabeddin Suhreverdi, Islam felsefesi tarihinde, Isrâkilik adoyla bilinenekolun kurucusudur. Kosa suren hayatona ragmen bircok eser yazmostor. Ne var ki,eserlerinin tam listesi, henuz tespit edilmemis durumdador. Arastormamoza gore,Suhreverdi, 102 adet eser kaleme almos, fakat bunlaron 24 adeti kayop gorunmektedir.Bu calosma ile konuyla ilgili boslugu tamamladogomoz kanaatindeyim

This article documents intellectual life in Iran under the Mongols through the case of Hindūšāh Naḫjawānī (d. before 728/1327-28), a scholar known primarily as a historian who has gained a certain notoriety thanks to the pioneering works of Edgard Browne and ʿAbbās Iqbāl on his Tajārib alsalaf. New sources allow to rectify a number of approximations and mistakes about his origin, his name, his works, his career and his scholarly interests. The resulting portrait of Hindūšāh illustrates several key features of the scholarly life of medieval Islam in general and of the Ilkhanid period in particular: social mobility (via Hindūšāh's rise from a Turkish military background to a well-educated scholar), geographical mobility (through his constant travels from his home region of Naḫjawān), linguistic fluidity in his writings (between Persian and Arabic, but without the slightest interest in Turkish), political context (specifically, the increasing "Shiitisation" of the late Ilkhanate), and, last but not least, loyalty to his patrons. Hindūšāh not only enjoyed the protection of the Juwaynī brothers at a time when they wielded tremendous power in the early Ilkhanate state but also remained loyal to their memory decades after their fall in the 680/1280s. It helps explain his disillusioned view of historiographical writing but also his choice of works to copy. Hindūšāh remained an independent scholar, finding solace from distressing historical events in the study of philosophy and the reading of poetry.

This article analyzes how the Syriac word for 'drop,' nuṭptā, was used by Barhebraeus (1226-1286) with the meaning of 'drop of semen' or 'sperm drop.' The term appears in Barhebraeus's writings within broader examinations of substantial change, embryology, and ensoulment. I argue that Barhebraeus received the term in this sense from Avicenna (ca. 980-1037), including the latter's concept of substantial change. While Barhebraeus's reception of Avicenna's philosophy has implications for his position regarding the time of ensoulment of the unborn, the independence of Barhebraeus's embryology will also become apparent. The paper thus contributes to research on notions of the unborn in both Arabic and especially Syriac literature and the investigation of Barhebraeus's creative appropriation of Avicennan philosophy. These two aspects are connected by analyzing the critical term nuṭptā/nuṭfah.

philosophers following Avicenna (d. 428/1037) share his view that the human soul originates with the human body and lives on eternally after its death. The only 7th/13th-century philosopher to reject the origination of the human soul and to argue systematically for its eternity a parte ante is Ibn Kammūna. 'Izz al-Dawla Sa'd ibn Mans • ūr Ibn Kammūna was a Jewish philosopher active in Baghdad during the Īlkhānid period. During the later stages of his career he enjoyedas did many of his peers-the patronage of members of the prominent Juwaynī family, the Dawlatshāh clan, and their clients. When Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī fell out of favor and was executed together with some of his sons in the year 683/1284, Ibn Kammūna had to leave the city under tumultuous circumstances. He seems to have taken refuge with his son in al-H • illa where he is said to have died soon afterwards. 1 Western scholars know Ibn Kammūna as the author of comparative works on religion. 2 His philosophical work, however, remains understudied relative to its * This paper was prepared within the European Research Council's FP7 project Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in the Medieval World of Islam at the Research Unit Intellectual History of the Islamicate World of Freie Universität Berlin. It outlines some material from my PhD thesis on Ibn Kammūna written at Yale University under the direction of Dimitri Gutas. I extend my gratitude to all participants of the 2010 SOAS conference "The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought" for the lively discussion on a preliminary draft of the paper and to both Ayman Shihadeh and the anonymous reviewer for their invaluable comments on the penultimate draft. For all remaining deficiencies I alone am responsible. 1 Sources on the biography of Ibn Kammūna are collected and discussed in

This course explores Muslim-Christian interactions from the 7 th to the 13 th centuries. Through a close reading of texts spanning theology, philosophy, historiography, and poetry, we will examine the intricate and creative ways in which members of these two world faiths engaged with each other. Throughout the course, we will consider how theological and religious issues intersect with social, intellectual, and literary encounters within each tradition.

On ikinci yüzyıl İslâm düşüncesinin genel çerçevesini ve sudûr teorisine dayalı klasik kozmolojiyi paylaşmalarına rağmen İşrâkî felsefe, kavramsal çerçevesi ve yöntemiyle Meşşâîlikten farklılaşarak kendine özgü bir sistem hüviyeti kazanmıştır. Heyula ve suret kavramlarına dayalı Meşşâî cisim teorisini eleştiren Sühreverdî (549/1154-587/1191) nur kavramına indirgediği evren tasarımını tamamlayacak şekilde miktar temelli bir cisim teorisi kurgulamıştır. Çağının amaçları ve motivasyonları dâhilinde olgunlaşan söz konusu çaba, bu çalışmada cismin tanımı ve mahiyeti, hangi bileşenlerden kurulduğu, cisimlerin birbirinden nasıl farklılaştığı ve bireyleştiği problemleri üzerinden analiz edilmiştir. Cismi heyula ve suret gibi duyu konusu olmayan bileşenler ve belirleyicilerden arındırarak salt miktara indirgeyen İşrâkî cisim teorisi Meşşâîliğin madde-suret, bilen-bilinen, ayaltı-ayüstü benzeri ikiliklerinin aşılması ve fiziksel evrenin bütünleştirilmesi yolunda erken bir teşebbüs olarak yorumlanmıştır.

I should, I suppose, begin by taking some personal responsibility for this controversy. When my late friend Hossein Ziai and I published our edition and translation of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (hereafter Philosophy of Illumination), we chose "in nate" as our rendering of fiṭrī. I don't remember discussing the rendering, and we did not bother to mention it in the glossary. Hossein had used this rendering in his first book, Knowledge and Illumination, stating that "innate ideas serve as the grounds for knowledge." 1 Others, however, have rendered the term and its source, fiṭra, as "nature," "natural spirit," 2 or "innate disposition." 3 So what does fiṭra mean? AlTahānawī, in his dictionary of Islamic technical ter minology, cites the famous saying of the Prophet, "Every child born is born with the fiṭra, but his parents make him a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian," observing that "they disagree about its meaning." 4 More to the point is his discussion of fiṭrīyāt :

Mind and brain/matter interaction is one of the important and controversial issues in Islamic philosophy. In fact, in the resources of Islamic philosophy, one of the basic parts of philosophical discussions is related to mind’s nature and its interaction with the brain. Especially, in Avicenna’s philosophy, there are many articles and books which have addressed the topic of mind and brain and the relation between them. Avicenna was a profound philosopher, an expert physicist and a proficient physician of his time. Because of his experimental proficiency in medicine and surgery and his deep philosophical analysis, his discussion about mind and brain is very interesting for our time, due to recent advances in neuroscience. In this article, we have explained one of Avicenna’s arguments (in his famous opus “al-Isharat”) about the incorporeity of mind (self), which is very close to modern neuroscience and physics literature. In addition, we explain his model...

The flying man thought experiment upon which Avicenna grounds his theory of self-awareness (al-shu‘ūr al-dhātī) and justifies the argument that the soul is an immaterial, incorporeal and independent substance, has drawn as much interest in the modern era as it has in the classical Islamic and Latin worlds, spawning various interpretations on what to make of the experiment’s basic claim and purpose. Commentators of both traditions differ on the basic claim and purpose of the flying man experiment, depending the ontological and epistemological attitudes they emphasize. This study firstly tries to clarify the claim and purpose of the experiment, inasmuch as it forms the basis of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s criticisms. It proceeds to briefly point out the context of the experiment from Avicenna to al-Rāzī, and examine al-Rāzī’s comments and criticisms thereof. Since he rejects the claim that the soul is an immaterial, incorporeal and independent substance, it follows that al-Rāzī does not un...

İslâm felsefenin klasik dönem çalışmalarının ardından, on ikinci yüzyıl sonrasında ortaya çıkan yeni yapılanmanın resmini görmek ve sonraki süreci anlamak bakımından İbn Kemmûne (ö. 1284) dikkat çeken isimlerdendir. Bu makale onun daha önce akademik camiada tartışılmamış cisim teorisiyle ilgilidir. Bundan dolayı konu, mümkün bir mahiyet olarak cismin nasıl varlık kazandığı ve bu süreci yönlendiren ilkelerin tabiat alanına nasıl yansıdığı, cismin ne olduğu, kurucu unsurları, çeşitleri, nitelikleri ve eklentileri çerçevesinde tabiat felsefesi ve metafizikle bağlantılı olarak ele alınmıştır. Böylece İbn Kemmûne’ye göre ilk cismin ilk felek olduğu, daha sonrakilerin sudûr süreci içerisinde meydana geldiği ve cismin sebebinin akıl olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca madde ve sûretten oluşan cismin; kesintisiz, kendisine işaret edilen ve aklen sonsuz bölünebilir bir cevher olduğu belirlenmiş, ancak cismin kurucu unsurlarından olan madde ve sûretin cevher kategorisi altında değerlendirilmediğ...

Isrâkiligin kurucusu olarak kabul edilen Şihabuddin Suhreverdi bir donem Messâi ogretiyi esas almisken daha sonra kendi dusuncesini gelistirmistir. O, Isrâkiligi tesis ederken iki farkli dusunceyi birlestirmeye calismistir. Suhreverdi’nin sistemi belirli parcalardan mutesekkildir. Mantik, onun dusuncesinin unsurlarindan biridir. Bu acidan onun mantik anlayisi oldukca onemlidir.  Suhreverdi mantik ve metot olarak Messâilerin en onemli dayanagi olan burhandan yola cikarak, Isrâkiligin en merkezi kavramlarindan biri olan irfana ulasmistir. Burhan, teoriyi esas almisken, irfan, kimi zaman teelluh, hads, kesf seklinde de adlandirilan mistik kavramlara dayanir.  Suhreverdi tarafindan daha cok teorik felsefenin icinde degerlendirilen mantik, bir alet vasfindadir ve fazla ayrintili olmayan bir takim kurallardan mutesekkildir.

I should, I suppose, begin by taking some personal responsibility for this controversy. When my late friend Hossein Ziai and I published our edition and translation of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (hereafter Philosophy of Illumination), we chose "in nate" as our rendering of fiṭrī. I don't remember discussing the rendering, and we did not bother to mention it in the glossary. Hossein had used this rendering in his first book, Knowledge and Illumination, stating that "innate ideas serve as the grounds for knowledge." 1 Others, however, have rendered the term and its source, fiṭra, as "nature," "natural spirit," 2 or "innate disposition." 3 So what does fiṭra mean? AlTahānawī, in his dictionary of Islamic technical ter minology, cites the famous saying of the Prophet, "Every child born is born with the fiṭra, but his parents make him a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian," observing that "they disagree about its meaning." 4 More to the point is his discussion of fiṭrīyāt :

This work, which examines the ethical thought of the famous theologian and scholar of literature al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869), consists of an introduction and three chapters. The introduction discusses al-Jāḥiẓ's sources of ethical thought and its originality, along with the research methodology, and describes the concepts of nature and subjectivity that make up the title. According to Yunus Cengiz, what al-Jāḥiẓ means by nature is that all actions done by humans take place in a natural way, as for the subjectivity he means that humans can intervene in this natural process and thereby construct oneself. Thus, each subject's construction will be inevitably unique. Hence subjectivity is used not in its common meaning, but with reference to thinkers such as Michel Foucault (d. 1984) and Gilles Deleuze (d. 1995).